MILITARY LOGISTIC ESTIMATE

LOGISTIC PLANNING GROUP

Director Defense Logistic Plans & Policy

MAF-DLD

AREA OF INTEREST

- TERM OF REFERENCE
- SUSTAINING WARFIGHTERS
- THE HOW TO?
- KEY TAKE AWAYS

"Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act, logistics brings the troops to this point."

General Antoine Henri Jomini,
Precis de l'Art de la Guerre (The Art of War) 1838

TERM OF REFERENCE

RESTRICTED

MAFJD 5-01

MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES
JOINT DOCTRINE

JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING

2011

RESTRICTED



Figure 2-1: Joint Planning Community

TERM OF REFERENCE


RESTRICTED

MAFJD 4-01

MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES
JOINT DOCTRINE

LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

2013

RESTRICTED

117. At the strategic level, the Assistant Chief of Staff Defence Logistics Division (ACOS DLD) of MAF HQ is responsible for the coordination of logistics and other requirements to sustain the MAF where it is not practical for the single Services to do so. At the operational level, the JFHQ shall forecasts and prioritises the logistics support necessary to implement his operational concept and allocates priorities for obtaining and deployment resources. The local commanders provide advice and ensure support is provided to meet the JFHQ requirements. Subordinate headquarters will bid through single Service channel for logistics support which must be provided by the single Service to meet the entire JFHQ's requirements. The coordination of logistics support at the strategic level is addressed in Chapter 2.

208. At this level, the CDF commands the MAF and is the principal military adviser to the Minister of Defence who ultimately provides strategic direction to the MAF. The principle of unity in command applies equally to the field of logistics as it does to operations and it follows that at any level, there should be a single authority responsible for logistics support. ACOS DLD is a CDF principle staff officer to carry ownership of strategic logistics issues, ownership of logistics processes in support of operations and the conduct of strategic level immediate and deliberate planning through the LPG. LPG is also responsible for management of the flow of materiel from the single Service support to the theatre and for the coordination of logistics support for the operations at the operational level of command. LPG shall comprise of the following members:

LOGISTIC PLANNING GP (LPG)

CHAIRMAN - ACOS DLD MAF HQ

MEMBERS
- ACOS G4 / N4 / A4
- J1 MAF HQ
- J9 MAF HQ
- CO-OPTED AS REQUIRED

SECRETARY - DIRECTOR POLICY & PLANS DLD MAF HQ

TERM OF REFERENCE

RESTRICTED

MAFJP 5-01.3

MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES JOINT PROCEDURAL PUBLICATION

JOINT LOGISTICS PLANNING PROCESS (JLPP)

2019

RESTRICTED



Figure 1-3: Sequence of Joint Operation and Joint Logistics Planning Process

1-7

RESTRICTED

SUSTAINING WARFIGHTERS



NATIONAL POLICY — RESTORE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

THEATER STRATEGY — DESTROY THE THREAT FROM THE CORE

CAMPAIGNS — OPERATION BALDHEAD

MAJOR OPERATIONS — JTF 57 ~ LAUNCH A COUNTER OFFENSIVE TO DESTROY THE THREAT DIV GP

BATTLES — JTG 57.2 ~ ATTACKS THE THREAT BDE GP

ENGAGEMENTS — JTE 57.2.2 ~ ENGAGE THE THREAT BATTLEGP AT LINE X-RAY

SMALL UNIT AND CREW ACTION — JTU 57.2.2.5 ~ PENDEKAR ENGAGE AND DESTROY THE THREAT MBT

NATIONAL SUPPORT BASE

JOINT MAINT AREA

CORPS MAINT AREA

DIV MAINT AREA

BDE MAINT AREA

RESUPPLY A1/A2

THE HOW TO

LPG-LSE

SPG-MSE

JCC

ID

COLS

JOPG

MILITARY OPTIONS – JFC

NATIONAL SUPPORT BASE

JOINT MAINT AREA

CORPS MAINT AREA

DIV MAINT AREA

BDE MAINT AREA

RESUPPLY A1/A2

MOBILISATION POLICY

ADMIN 0

LOG MSN 0

THE SAMPLE …..

- IT’S NOT THE SOLUTION
- IT’S EXHAUSTIVE
- IT’S DYNAMIC

- AND IT’S YOURS



ADF HQ – DEF LOG BRANCH
Ministry of Defence
KUALA AMAN

06 H Aug 19

MILITARY LOGISTIC ESTIMATE 1/2019

Ref:
A. Maps and Charts.
B. National Security Council Directive No. 03/2019 dated 3 Aug 19.
C. CDF Guidance dated 6 Aug 19.
D. Intelligence Estimate No 1 dated 7 Aug 19.

REVIEW OF SITUATION

1. **Period of Tension (POT)**. 6 Aug 2019, a major clash between TIG security forces and Plainchants militias supported by DRP was seen sporadically IVO North of TIG. In relation to that Intel estimate had indicate there will be an amphibious training exercise IVO 150 nm NW TIG expected in mid-August 2019 (Projected 14 Aug 19). It is believed that the exercise will be conducted at 150 nm Northwest TIG near the contested water. However, based on current indication and as the tension escalates between DRP and AMANLAND, this exercise so-called combat readiness might turn to the military invasion of TIG.

2. **Escalation of Conflict (EOC)**. Based on indicator and warning (IW), the exercise would be the precursor to full military invasion into TIG NLT 21 Aug 19. AMANLAND Armed Forces (AAF) will be tasked to mobilized iot preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3. **LOGSTAT**. Overall readiness of the AAF logistic architecture in support of the deployed assigned components as at 6 Aug 19 are categorised as **PMC**, details based on the deployed components are as follows:

LOG STATUS	**COMPONENT**			
	LAND	**MARITIME**	**AIR**	**SF**
CAPABILITY	FMC	FMC	PMC	FMC
READINESS	PMC	PMC	PMC	FMC

4. **Planning Consideration**. Planning will be considering resources available within military and national supply chain. The logistic capability generation are implied as **HIGH PRIORITY** by the **National Security Council**. Key considerations throughout the planning are the following:

a. The **Minimum Information Set (MIS)** key elements are as follows:

SER	MIS ELEMENT	INFORMATION	
		REQUIREMENT	PURPOSE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Destination	• Where are the likely locations of 3rd, 2nd and 1st Lines? • What are the restrictions on strategic L of C, APODs and SPODs?	• Determine the required L of c and tpt mode required. • Forecast intra theatre resource available. • Ident suitable Strat L of C, APOD and SPOD • Determine the required intra theatre L of C and nodes.
2.	Intensity	• What is the combat activity profile?	• Identify the force rate of consumption.
3.	Scale	• What Force elm will be deployed? • What is the force disposition (within the lines of sp)?	• Identify the Force elm will be sp. • Determine the lift capacity iot facilitate the ops mov. • Ident elements that will have Active Combat consumption rate.
4.	Key Timings	• What is the deployment time scale? • What is the force elm priority of move? • What is the duration of the op?	• Determine the deployment mov rqmt. • Ident the D-Day. • Determine the sp plan for the Joint Supply Chain (JSC). • Forecast recovery and retrograde rqmt.

b. **Decision Sp Tools (DST)**. In order to facilitate rapid generation, population and configuration of the Joint Force Logistic Supply Chain, and to enable all log COA to be modelled, validated and examined, **Network Centric Operation (NCO) Resource Management System (RMS)** is to be employed strictly as the primary Logistic Information System (LIS). The DST will facilitate situational awareness through a common **Joint Log Operating Picture** (JLOP).

5. **Log Capability Requirement Analysis**. These logistic capabilities are crucial throughout the ops IOT sustain the op tempo. The capabilities requirement matrix will be as follows:

SER	LEVEL	CAPABILITIES	PRIORITY [1]	RISK [2]
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	Strategic	Facilities		
		War Reserves		
		Material Readiness		
		Strat Airlift and Sealift		
		Mobilization		
		Deployment and Support		
		Force Regeneration		
		Procurement		
2.	Operational	Arrival & Assembly		
		Intra-theatre Lift		
		Theatre Distribution		
		Sustainment		
		Reconstitution and Redeployment		
		Force Closure		
3.	Tactical	Supply		
		Maintenance		
		Transportation		
		Health Services		
		Engineering & Services		

Note:
1. Indicate the priority to be given to a capability stated within the JSC/COLS as High – Low

2. Indicate the risks that the capability posed if not complied within the JSC/COLS as High – Medium – Low – Very Low

AIM OF THE ESTIMATE

6. To formulate a coherent and coordinated COLS that able to sustain AMANLAND AF op tempo in response to **DRPDF** direct military action against AMANLAND national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

LOG FACT AND ASSUMPTIONS (LOGFAT)

7. The assumptions and criteria that will influence overall planning are as follows:

a. JAO includes area within AMANLAND and Plainchants territorial waters. For logistic support, it encompasses the Named Area of Interest (NAI) including global suppliers.

b. Capability to deploy two JTF consist of one Combine Division (Army) each and supported by Maritime, Air and SF.

c. Most countries support AMANLAND on political and logistic but none on military support. FPDA members will support on HADR within AMANLAND and Singapore.

d. C^2 throughout the ops via NSC - JCC - JFC - JTFC

OPERATIONAL DESIGN

8. **Task Organisations (TO)**. Based on **Ref C**, the TO that will be deployed are depicted below:

COMPONENT			
LAND	MAR	AIR	SF
MANOEVER • 2 x CA DIV 4 x Inf Bde 1 X Mechanised Bde) • 1 x Bde RDF **FS** • 1 x MLRS Regt • 1 x Locating Bty **AD** • 2 x AD Regt **ISR** • 1 x Int Bn • 1 x Army Aviation Sqn (LOH)	**COMBATANT** • 2 x Frigate • 6 x Corvette **PATROL** • 2 x OPV • 6 x FAC (M) • 4 x FAC (G) **COMD & SP** • 2 x MPCSS • 4 x MCMV • 6 x Super Lynx • 6 x Fennec	**MRCA** • 8 x F/A18D • 10 X MiG-29N **LCA-CAS** • 16 x Hawk 108/208 • 8 x MB 339A **STRAT AIRLIFT** • NIL **TAC AIRLIFT** • 8 x C130 • 2 x KC130H • 4 x CN 235 **SAR** • 12 x S61A4 Nuri • 2 x B200T (MPA) **ISRT** • ADOC, SOC 1 and SOC 2 • Sqn 321 • Sqn 322 • Sqn 323	**LAND** • 1 x SBS SQN • 1 x CTU (LRRU) • 1 x PARA CDO SQN **MAR** • 1 x PASKAL REGT **AIR** • 1 x PASKAU REGT • 1 x GFAC • 1 x LRRU

9. **Key Combat Systems**. The projected systems that are required and sustained at FMC throughout the operation are described below:

SER	COMPONENT	EQUIPMENT	AVAILABILITY	MINIMUM READINESS STATUS BASED ON THE OP TEMPO		
				START STATE	CBT	HIGH INTENSITY CBT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(h)
1.	Land	CA DIV	2	100	70	70
		Inf Bde	4	100	70	70
		Mechanised Bde)	1	100	70	70
		Bde RDF	1	100	70	70
		MLRS Regt	1	100	70	70
		Locating Bty	1	100	70	70
		AD Regt	2	100	70	70
		Int Bn	1	100	70	70
		Army Aviation Sqn (LOH)	1	100	70	70
2.	Maritime	FFG	2	CAT 2	CAT 2	CAT 2
		CORV	2	CAT 2	CAT 2	CAT 2
3.	Air	F/A 18D	8	MC	MC	MC
		MiG-29N	10	MC	MC	MC
		Hawk 108/208	16	MC	MC	MC
		MB 339A	8	MC	MC	MC

10. **Manpower Status**.

SER	LOCATION	ACTIVITY					FORCE TOTAL
		LAND	MAR	AIR	OTHER AGENCY	CONTRACTOR SP	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(e)	(f)	(h)
1.	M/BASE	15000	500	500	30	500	16530
2.	FOB	10000	200	100	10	100	10410
3.	TIG (Offensive)	10000	200	100	0	0	10300
4.	M/BASE (Surge)	5000	300	400	20	400	6120

11. **Supported Component**. Throughout the ops, the components that will be supported based on CONOP will be prioritised as follows:

a. MARITIME.

b. AIR.

c. LAND.

12. **Deployment Period**. Components will deploy in order to meet the following timelines:

PHASE	OPERATIONAL TASK	TIMELINE				
		LAND	MAR	AIR	OTHER AGENCY	CONTRACTOR SP
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(e)	(f)
1.	Preparation & Deployment	D-14			D-7	
2.	Deterrence	D-7				
3.	Offensive	D-DAY			AS REQUIRED	
4.	Sustainment / Redeployment	D+7	D+7	D+7	D+14	D+14

13. **Operational Profile**. The operational profile that will be employed is described as follows:

DELIBERATE INTERVENTION OPS REQUIRING **START STATE** FORCE GENERATION SUSTAINMENT, AND RETAINING A SUSTAINED IN THEATRE CBT POWER WITH THE ABILITY TO SURGE WITHIN A **HIGH INTENSITY COMBAT ENVIRONMENT**

14. **CONOP**. **Op BERSATU MAJU** is an offensive action in order to regain Territorial control over TIG employing a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) task organisations. The op tempo will be within a 4-phase operational design which are Preparation, Deterrence/Control, Offensive and Sustained/Redeployment within the span of 30-90 days of operation.

15. **Other Operation(s)**. The Joint Logistics support structure is capable to adapt within all facet of military options within the operational timeline.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT ARCHITECTURE

16. **Concept of Log Sp (COLS)**. The op tempo of **Op BERSATU MAJU** is sustained by incorporating both **military (inter and intra-theatre) and national logistics architecture**. The support system is superimposed through the **national military industrial base** and augmented further via G to G (FPDA) arrangement in other non-combat operations. The sustainment endurance throughout the campaign will be 30 – 90 days.

17. **Other Operation(s)**. The Joint Logistics support structure is capable to adapt within all facet of military options within the operational timeline.

18. **The Support Design**. The operation will be sustained with the following support super structure which are robust and flexible in adapting to the required op tempo throughout the campaign:



A/SPOE	Air/Sea Port of Embarkation	A/R/SPOD	Air/Rail/Sea Port of Disembarkation
FMB	Forward Mounting Base	ALSS	Advance Logistic Support Site
JSB	Joint Sea Base	FLS	Forward Logistic Site
AFSUP	Afloat Support	DOB	Deployed Operating Base

19. **Logistic Effect**. Based on the support architecture, the logistics effects that will be generated in preserving the op tempo is illustrated below:



LOGISTIC EFFECT	
EFFECTS	DEFINITION
RECEIVE	RECEIVE CONSIGNMENT
CAPTURE	CAPTURE AND TRACK CONSIGNMENT
RECONFIGURE	RECONFIGURE OR BREAKDOWN CONSIGNMENTS
TRANSHIP	TRANSFER FROM ONE FORM OF TRANSPORT TO ANOTHER
X LOAD	MOVE CONSIGNMENT FROM ONE TRANSPORT ASSET TO ANOTHER OF THE SAME MODE

LOGISTIC EFFECT	
EFFECTS	DEFINITION
INVENTORY	PLANNED INVENTORY HOLDING
STAGE	STAGE ELEMENT FOR ENTRY INTO THEATRE
ISSUE	ISSUE CONSIGNMENT TO RECEIVING UNIT
DESPATCH	DESPATCH ON CONSIGNMENT ON LOG IS SYSTEM
RETURN	RETURN CONSIGNMENT TO UNIT, REPAIR OR DISPOSAL

20. **Logistic Support Endurance/Performance**. The JSC that will be deployed throughout the operations will establish a steady-consistent-robust logistic flow during the operation within the desired op tempo.

a. **Frequency of Supply**. The supply and resupply frequency will be based on the CONOP's op tempo required. The JSC will be enable to adapt and react throughout the pre-programmed Line of Operation (LOO) or any demand surged as required.

b. **Supply Chain Lead Time (SCLT)**. In ensuring the agility of the JSC, the stipulated lead time for the JSC will be achieved via a consistent inventory of critical items or commodities that able to adapt to any demand surged not more than 7 days. In addition to that, the JSC will be augmented through the current procurement mechanism.

c. **Theatre Stockholding Policy**. The policy in effect shall be applied throughout the JSC. The stockholding metrics will be as follows:

SER	COMPONENT	LEVEL	DOS	SCLT (days)	PRIORITIES (DOS)		
					START STATE	CBT	HIGH INTENSITY CBT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1.	Land	DIV	14	7	3	4	7
		BDE	7	3	1	3	4
		UNIT	3	1	1	1	1
	TOTAL		**24**		**4**	**8**	**12**
2.	Maritime	TG	21	7	3	4	14
		TU	14	3	3	4	7
	TOTAL		**35**		**6**	**8**	**21**
3.	Air	TG	14	7	3	4	7
	TOTAL		**14**		**3**	**4**	**7**

21. **Commodities Demand PROFILE**. The projected JSC stock level are based on the projected doctrinal consumption rate and within the CONOP op tempo:

SER	CLASS OF SUPPLY	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	FORCE STOCK LEVEL(DOS)		
				START STATE	CBT	HIGH INTENSITY CBT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	**I**	WATER	Potable	3	7	14
			Bottled	3	7	14
			Veh Maint	3	3	7
			Aircraft Maint	3	3	7
			NBC Decont	3	3	7
			Medical	3	7	14
			Hygiene	3	3	7
		RATION	Fresh	3	7	14
			MRE	3	7	21
2.	**II**	MATERIAL	Scaled - Head to Toe	3	3	7
			Spares	3	7	14
3.	**III**	POL	FUEL - Diesel	3	7	14
			FUEL - Petrol	3	7	14
			FUEL - AVTUR	3	7	14
			LUBRICANTS	3	7	14
4.	**IV**	ENGINEER	Constructions	3	3	7
			Def Stores	3	7	14
5.	**V**	AMMO	Small Arms	3	7	21
			Arty	3	7	21
			Msl (Land)	3	7	14
			Msl (Mar)	3	7	14
			Msl (Air)	3	7	14
			Explosives	3	7	14
6.	**VII**	MEDICAL	Blood & Components	3	7	21
			Consumable	3	7	21
			Material	3	7	21

22. **Finance and Budget**. The estimated financial and budgeting implications throughout the operation based on the stipulated CONOPS. The financial provisions employed throughout are within the federal fiscal budget OE. In addition to that, the financial shortfall due to any operational logistical surge will be augmented through the AP 55 instruments. The projected financial support to maintain the required op tempo are indicated as follows:

SER	PHASE	COMPONENT FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (MYR Billion) [1]			
		LAND	MAR	AIR	**TOTAL**
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	PREP & DEPLOY	0.50	1.50	2.00	**4.00**
2.	DETERRENCE	1.50	2.00	2.50	**6.00**
3.	OFFENSIVE	2.50	2.50	3.00	**8.00**
4.	SUSTAINMENT & REDEPLOY	1.00	2.00	2.00	**5.00**
5.	**TOTAL**	**5.50**	**8.00**	**9.50**	**23.00**
	OE (B 60 FY 2019)	**5.29**	**1.35**	**1.58**	**8.22**
	SHORTFALL	**(0.21)**	**(6.65)**	**(7.92)**	**(14.78)**
	AP 55 [2]	**0.21**	**6.65**	**7.92**	**14.78**

Note:
1. The financial implications are based on the average operational activity (start state – Combat – High Intensity Combat)
2. Official request to the NSC via JCC in endorsing the AP 55 mechanism to be in effect. Upon clearance, the funds will be channelled through the Logistics Architecture

KEY ESSENTIAL FACTS

23. **Capabilities and Preparedness**. Based on the logistic architecture and COLS, the projected support structure able to prepare the force within the highest state of capability and readiness status. The NSC will endorsed to employ all national instruments to support the military operation when necessary under the HANRUH mechanism.

24. **Allies, IGO and NGO Support/Assistance**. The prevailing circumstances would determine the extent and nature of the response by other nations or organisations.

a. **Allies**. FPDA will extent logistic support for non military HADR operations within the JAO.

b. **Other Nations/Organisations**.

(1) **Multi-Lateral**. ASEAN will maintain a non interference posture throughout the operations.

(2) **Bi-Lateral**. Indonesia will provide Freedom of Navigation via its territorial waters for our logistics vessels en-route to TIG.

(3) **NGO/IGO**.

(a) **ICRC**. Will conduct humanitarian assistance within the JAO.

(b) **MERCY**. Will conduct humanitarian assistance within the JAO.

(c) ***Médecins Sans Frontiers***. Operating its afloat hospital vessel IVO TIG territorial waters in response to the humanitarian crisis within the JAO.

CDF GUIDANCE

25. Details as indicated in **Ref C** were strictly abided throughout the estimate process.

CONCLUSION

26. **This document is to be handled with high security adherence. It is not to be reproduced in whatever means.**

DATO' PAHLAWAN MUZAFAR SHAH BIN MOSAM SHAH
Maj Gen
Chief Logistic Planning Group

OPS BERSATU MAJU 19

MIL STRAT LOG ESTIMATE

LOGISTICS PLANNING GROUP

LEADER:

LT COL MUZAFAR SHAH MOSAM SHAH (CP 12) - LEADER

MEMBERS:

LT COL ABDUL RAZAK BIN HJ MOHD SAID (CP 6)

CDR MOHD NAZREE BIN MOHD NOR RMN (CP 29)

SCOPE

- LOGFAT
- REVIEW OF SIT
  - LOGSTAT
  - PLANNING CONSIDERATION
  - LOGCAP ANALYSIS
- OPERATIONAL DESIGN
  - CONOPS
- LOG SP ARCHITECTURE
  - COLS
- KEY ESSENTIAL FACTS
- CONCLUSION

LOGFAT

- JAO INCLUDES AREA WITHIN AMANLAND, TIG AND PLAINCHANTS TERRITORIAL WATERS
- NAI WILL INCLUDE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN
- JSC ARE ENABLED IN SUPPORT AT LEAST 2 x JTF CONSIST OF ONE COMBINE DIVISION (ARMY) EACH AND SUPPORTED BY MARITIME, AIR AND SF
- EXTERNAL SUPPORT WILL BE RENDERED WITHIN THE PREMIS OF HADR AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION
- C^2 THROUGHOUT THE OPS VIA NSC - JCC - JFC - JTFC

REVIEW OF SITUATION

- LOGSTAT (as at 6 Aug 19)

LOG STATUS	COMPONENT			
	LAND	MARITIME	AIR	SF
CAPABILITY	FMC	FMC	PMC	FMC
READINESS	PMC	PMC	PMC	FMC

REVIEW OF SITUATION

- **PLANNING CONSIDERATION**
  - STATUS
    - **HIGH PRIORITY**
  - RESOURCES
    - **MIL SUPPLY CHAIN**
    - **NATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN**
    - **MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX**
  - FOCUSED AREA
    - **FORCE GENERATION**
    - **JT LOG OP PICTURE**

REVIEW OF SITUATION

LOGCAP ANALYSIS

SER	LEVEL	CAPABILITIES	PRIORITY [1]	RISK [2]
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	Strategic	Facilities		
		War Reserves		
		Material Readiness		
		Strat Airlift and Sealift		
		Mobilization		
		Deployment and Support		
		Force Regeneration		
		Procurement		
2.	Operational	Arrival & Assembly		
		Intra-theatre Lift		
		Theatre Distribution		
		Sustainment		
		Reconstitution and Redeployment		
		Force Closure		
3.	Tactical	Supply		
		Maintenance		
		Transportation		
		Health Services		
		Engineering & Services		

Note:

1. Indicate the priority to be given to a capability stated within the JSC/COLS as High – Low
2. Indicate the risks that the capability posed if not complied within the JSC/COLS as High – Medium – Low – Very Low

OP DESIGN

- TASKORG

COMPONENT			
LAND	MAR	AIR	SF
MANOEVER • 2 x CA DIV 4 x Inf Bde 1 X Mechanised Bde) • 1 x Bde RDF **FS** • 1 x MLRS Regt • 1 x Locating Bty **AD** • 2 x AD Regt **ISR** • 1 x Int Bn • 1 x Army Aviation Sqn (LOH)	**COMBATANT** • 2 x Frigate • 6 x Corvette **PATROL** • 2 x OPV • 6 x FAC (M) • 4 x FAC (G) **COMD & SP** • 2 x MPCSS • 4 x MCMV • 6 x Super Lynx • 6 x Fennec	**MRCA** • 8 x F/A18D • 10 X MiG-29N **LCA-CAS** • 16 x Hawk 108/208 • 8 x MB 339A **STRAT AIRLIFT** • NIL **TAC AIRLIFT** • 8 x C130 • 2 x KC130H • 4 x CN 235 **SAR** • 12 x S61A4 Nuri • 2 x B200T (MPA) **ISRT** • ADOC, SOC 1 and SOC 2 • Sqn 321 • Sqn 322 • Sqn 323	**LAND** • 1 x SBS SQN • 1 x CTU (LRRU) • 1 x PARA CDO SQN **MAR** • 1 x PASKAL REGT **AIR** • 1 x PASKAU REGT • 1 x GFAC • 1 x LRRU

OP DESIGN

- KEY CBT SYS

SER	COMPONENT	EQUIPMENT	AVAILABILITY	MINIMUM READINESS STATUS BASED ON THE OP TEMPO		
				START STATE	CBT	HIGH INTENSITY CBT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(h)
1.	Land	CA DIV	2	**100**	**80**	**80**
		Inf Bde	4	**100**	**80**	**80**
		Mechanised Bde)	1	**100**	**70**	**70**
		Bde RDF	1	**100**	**70**	**70**
		MLRS Regt	1	**100**	**70**	**70**
		Locating Bty	1	**100**	**70**	**70**
		AD Regt	2	**100**	**70**	**70**
		Int Bn	1	**100**	**70**	**70**
		Army Aviation Sqn (LOH)	1	**100**	**70**	**70**
2.	Maritime	FFG	2	**CAT 2**	**CAT 2**	**CAT 2**
		CORV	2	**CAT 2**	**CAT 2**	**CAT 2**
3.	Air	F/A 18D	8	**MC**	**MC**	**MC**
		MiG-29N	10	**MC**	**MC**	**MC**
		Hawk 108/208	16	**MC**	**MC**	**MC**
		MB 339A	8	**MC**	**MC**	**MC**

OP DESIGN

- MANPOWER STATUS

SER	LOCATION	ACTIVITY					FORCE TOTAL
		LAND	MAR	AIR	OTHER AGENCY	CONTRACTOR SP	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(e)	(f)	(h)
1.	MOUNTING BASE	15000	500	500	30	500	16530
2.	FOB	10000	200	100	10	100	10410
3.	TIG (OFFENSIVE)	10000	200	100	0	0	10300
4.	HOMEBASE (SURGE)	5000	300	400	20	400	6120

OP DESIGN

- DEPLOYMENT PERIOD (TIMELINE)

PHASE	OPERATIONAL TASK	TIMELINE				
		LAND	MAR	AIR	OTHER AGENCY	CONTRACTOR SP
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(e)	(f)
1.	PREPARATION & DEPLOYMENT	D-14			D-7	
2.	DETERRENCE	D-7				
3.	OFFENSIVE	D-DAY			AS REQUIRED	
4.	SUSTAINMENT / REDEPLOYMENT	D+7	D+7	D+7	D+14	D+14

OP DESIGN

- OP PROFILE

DELIBERATE INTERVENTION OPS REQUIRING **START STATE** FORCE GENERATION SUSTAINMENT, AND RETAINING A SUSTAINED IN THEATRE CBT POWER WITH THE ABILITY TO SURGE WITHIN A **HIGH INTENSITY COMBAT ENVIRONMENT**

OP DESIGN

- CONOP

Op BERSATU MAJU is an offensive action iot regain Territorial control over TIG employing a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) task organisations. The op tempo will be within a 4-phase operational design which are Preparation, Deterrence/Control, Offensive and Sustained/Redeployment within the span of NLT 45 days of operation

LOG SP ARCHITECTURE

- COLS

The op tempo of **Op BERSATU MAJU** is sustained by incorporating both **military (inter and intra-theatre) and national logistics architecture**. The support system is superimposed through the **national military industrial base** and augmented further via **G to G (FPDA) arrangement in other non-combat operations**. The sustainment endurance throughout the campaign will be **30 – 90 days**



A/SPOE	Air/Sea Port of Embarkation	A/R/SPOD	Air/Rail/Sea Port of Disembarkation
FMB	Forward Mounting Base	ALSS	Advance Logistic Support Site
JSB	Joint Sea Base	FLS	Forward Logistic Site
AFSUP	Afloat Support	DOB	Deployed Operating Base

LOG SP ARCHITECTURE

- LOG EFFECT



LOGISTIC EFFECT	
EFFECTS	DEFINITION
RECEIVE	RECEIVE CONSIGNMENT
CAPTURE	CAPTURE AND TRACK CONSIGNMENT
RECONFIGURE	RECONFIGURE OR BREAKDOWN CONSIGNMENTS
TRANSHIP	TRANSFER FROM ONE FORM OF TRANSPORT TO ANOTHER
X LOAD	MOVE CONSIGNMENT FROM ONE TRANSPORT ASSET TO ANOTHER OF THE SAME MODE

LOGISTIC EFFECT	
EFFECTS	DEFINITION
INVENTORY	PLANNED INVENTORY HOLDING
STAGE	STAGE ELEMENT FOR ENTRY INTO THEATRE
ISSUE	ISSUE CONSIGNMENT TO RECEIVING UNIT
DESPATCH	DESPATCH ON CONSIGNMENT ON LOG IS SYSTEM
RETURN	RETURN CONSIGNMENT TO UNIT, REPAIR OR DISPOSAL

LOG SP ARCHITECTURE

- LOG ENDURANCE & PERFORMANCE
  - FREQUENCY OF SUPPLY
    - PRE-PLANNED
    - SURGED
  - SUPPLY CHAIN LEAD TIME (SCLT)
    - 7 DAYS
    - CONTRACT SP

LOG SP ARCHITECTURE

- LOG ENDURANCE & PERFORMANCE

  - THEATER STOCKHOLDING POLICY

SER	COMPONENT	LEVEL	DOS	SCLT (days)	PRIORITIES (DOS)		
					START STATE	CBT	HIGH INTENSITY CBT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1.	Land	DIV	14	7	3	4	7
		BDE	7	3	1	3	4
		UNIT	3	1	1	1	1
	TOTAL		**24**		**4**	**8**	**12**
2.	Maritime	TG	21	7	3	4	14
		TU	14	3	3	4	7
	TOTAL		**35**		**6**	**8**	**21**
3.	Air	TG	14	7	3	4	7
	TOTAL		**14**		**3**	**4**	**7**

LOG SP ARCHITECTURE

- COMMODITIES DEMAND PROFILE

SER	CLASS OF SUPPLY	TYPE	DESCRIPTION	FORCE STOCK LEVEL(DOS)		
				START STATE	CBT	HIGH INTENSITY CBT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	I	WATER	Potable	3	7	14
			Bottled	3	7	14
			Veh Maint	3	3	7
			Aircraft Maint	3	3	7
			NBC Decont	3	3	7
			Medical	3	7	14
			Hygiene	3	3	7
		RATION	Fresh	3	7	14
			MRE	3	7	21
2.	II	MATERIAL	Scaled - Head to Toe	3	3	7
			Spares	3	7	14
3.	III	POL	FUEL - Diesel	3	7	14
			FUEL - Petrol	3	7	14
			FUEL - AVTUR	3	7	14
			LUBRICANTS	3	7	14
4.	IV	ENGINEER	Constructions	3	3	7
			Def Stores	3	7	14
5.	V	AMMO	Small Arms	3	7	21
			Arty	3	7	21
			Msl (Land)	3	7	14
			Msl (Mar)	3	7	14
			Msl (Air)	3	7	14
			Explosives	3	7	14
6.	VII	MEDICAL	Blood & Components	3	7	21
			Consumable	3	7	21
			Material	3	7	21

LOG SP ARCHITECTURE

- FINANCE AND BUDGET

SER	PHASE	COMPONENT FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (MYR Billion) [1]			
		LAND	MAR	AIR	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	PREP & DEPLOY	0.50	1.50	2.00	4.00
2.	DETERRENCE	1.50	2.00	2.50	6.00
3.	OFFENSIVE	2.50	2.50	3.00	8.00
4.	SUSTAINMENT & REDEPLOY	1.00	2.00	2.00	5.00
5.	TOTAL	5.50	8.00	9.50	23.00
	OE (B60 FY 2019)	5.29	1.35	1.58	8.22
	SHORTFALL	(0.21)	(6.65)	(7.92)	(14.78)
	AP 55 [2]	0.21	6.65	7.92	14.78

Note:

1. The financial implications are based on the average operational activity (start state – Combat – High Intensity Combat)
2. Official request to the NSC via JCC in endorsing the AP 55 mechanism to be in effect. Upon clearance, the funds will be channelled through the Logistics Architecture

KEY ESSENTIAL FACTS

- CAPABILITIES AND PREPAREDNESS
  - FORCE GENERATION
  - MOBILISATION OF CIV ASSET OBTAINED VIA NSC

- EXTERNAL SUPPORT
  - ALLIES
    - FPDA – NON CBT HADR MSN
  - MULTI-LATERAL
    - ASEAN – NON INTERFERANCE
  - UNI-LATERAL
    - INDONESIA – FONOPS
    - SINGAPORE – VIA FPDA MECHANISM
  - NGO/IGO
    - ICRC
    - MERCY
    - *Médecins Sans Frontiers*

CONCLUSION

REQUEST JCC TO VERIFY AND ENDORSED THE LOG ESTIMATE AND SUBSEQUENTLY EMPLOYED TO SUSTAINED OPS BERSATU MAJU

KEY TAKE AWAYS



01 **RESOURCES ARE SCARCE**

KNOW WHAT YOU ARE FOR !!

02 **PREPARATION IS CRUCIAL**

SCALE – PROXIMITY – INTENSITY - DURATION

03 **TO KNOW BEYOND THE FOG**

AVOID DRIP (DATA RICH INFO POOR) EFFECT

04 **REMEMBER THE ENDSTATE**

SYNC WITH THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE,
WHAT YOU ARE FOR IN THE FIRST PLACE


LOGGIES AREN'T SEXY…
BUT YOU NEED US …