

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (JIPOE)



defence intelligence staff division

STEP 3 & 4

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***TRAINING DIRECTORATE
DISD***

1a. Review the Situation
1b. Scope the Threats
1c. Identify Significant Operational Environment Characteristics
1d. Identify Areas of Intelligence Interest and Responsibility
1e. Identify CCIR

2a. Analyse Physical Characteristics of the Operational Environment
2b. Analyse Non-Physical Characteristics of the Operational Environment
2c. Summarise Critical Effects and Issues

JIPOE	
1	Define Operational Environment
2	Describe the Impact of OE
3	Evaluate Threat
4	Determine Threat COA/ Scenario's

3a. Review Threat Situation
3b. Analyse Threat Capability
3c. Conduct Threat Mission Analysis
3d. Undertake Threat Modelling

EVALUATE THE THREAT



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-  Sub Step 1 - Review Threat Situation
-  Sub Step 2 - Analyse Threat Capability
-  Sub Step 3 - Conduct Threat Mission Analysis
-  Sub Step 4 - Undertake Threat Modelling

1. Define OE Environment.
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EVALUATE THE THREAT



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- ❑ Analyse the operational threat environment to establish an understanding of threat capacity and risk to own force mission
- ❑ The analysis covers:
 - ❖ operational threat capabilities
 - ❖ dispositions and intentions
 - ❖ assessment of strengths and weaknesses
 - ❖ appreciation of the threat's normalcy patterns
- ... the analysis considers ideal conditions and limited constraints

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SS1 - Review Threat Situation



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Use ISR assets via:

- ☐ **Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP)** - a composite picture of activity of a maritime area of interest for a given time
- ☐ **Recognised Air Picture (RAP)** - complete listing of all aircraft in flight within a particular airspace with each aircraft being identified as friendly or hostile
- ☐ **Recognised Air-Surface Picture (RASP)** – Combined to determine data operational threat dispositions

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SS2 - Analyse Threat Capability

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❑ J2 to develop threat structure:

- ❖ ORBAT
- ❖ Component services
- ❖ Other government department or
- ❖ Affiliated organisation

❑ Thoroughly accessed the threat int and CI capabilities as the basis for:

- ❖ OPSEC plan
- ❖ Deception plan
- ❖ Collection plan
- ❖ Protective plan
- ❖ Security plan
- ❖ Force protection plan



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Analyse Threat Capability

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PROVIDE THREAT CAPABILITY OVERVIEW

The LANUN adv comd has the capability to conduct:

- Up to div-strength amph assaults, but is limited in range to that of land-based air support
- Up to regt-strength air op from LANUNLAND
- Real-time satellite surv of the AO (day and night) down to signature equipment detection
- Covert int collection within the MAF and the potential to conduct sabotage of MAF vital assets
- Limited sea denial ops in a KASUMA Island area


Analyse Threat Capability

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- **LANUN Army (LA) with a strength of about 120,000 regulars and supported by about 75,000 active reservists (from a 150,000 strong Army Reserve)**
- **Has the responsibility of protecting the homeland and defending the sovereignty of LANUNLAND**
- **The regular army is tasked to counter any form of external threat whilst the defence of the homeland is the responsibility of the reserve force**

LANUNLAND ARMED FORCES ORBAT



LAND CAPABILITY OVERVIEW

Element	BLUFOR		LANFOR	
Role	Strength	Capabilities	Strength	Capabilities
Infantry	4 Div Inf	App : 80,000 pers	3 x Inf Div 1x Mec Div	App : 120,000 pers 3 x Inf Regt 4 x Tk Regt 1 x Recon Bn
Airborne	1 Bde Para	3 Bn Para	1 x Regt (501 Para Regt)	
Armour	1 Bde Tk	1 Regt Tk 3 Regt Armd	1 x Div	4 x Tk Regt
Mech	1 Mech Bgd	3 Mech Bn	1 x Div Mek	3 x Mek Regt 1 x Tk Regt 4 x Recon bn
Special Forces	1 SF Gp	10 CDO Regt 1 Ranger 1 SAF	1 x Bn	6 x Raider Coy 1 x Sp Coy 1 x Svc Sp
Marine	-	-	1x Regt	3x Marine Bn 1 x Tk Bn

Sample 3-10

LAND CAPABILITY OVERVIEW

Cont:

	BLUFOR		LANUNLAND	
Role	Strength	Capabilities	Strength	Capabilities
Artillery	1 x Div Arty	▪ CS & DS Fire Sp ▪ Locating Bty	5 x Arty Regt	▪ SSM ▪ Tgt Acquisition ▪ CS & GS Fire Sp ▪ AD
Engineer	4 x Engr Regt	▪ Multirole bridge ▪ Clearance ▪ Construction	2 x Engr Regt	▪ Asphalt ▪ Real estate ▪ Multirole bridge ▪ Clearance ▪ Construction
Army Aviation	▪ 1 x Sqn LOH ▪ 1 x Sqn Transport	▪ Recce & Observation ▪ Transport	1 x Bn	▪ Recce & Observation ▪ Transport ▪ Gunship
Signal	4 x Sig Regt	EW	2 x Sig Regt	EW

Sample 3-10

NAVY CAPABILITY OVERVIEW

Elements	BLUFOR		LANFOR	
Operations	Strength	Capabilities	Strength	Capabilities
Above Water Warfare	▪ 2 FF ▪ 2 FFG	▪ SSM ▪ SAM ▪ Medium range guns	• 3 FFG • 2 heli	▪ SSM ▪ SAM ▪ Medium range guns ▪ ASM
Under Water Warfare	▪ 2 SSK ▪ Naval SF	Destruction of hostile surface and sub-surface assets	• 2 SSK • Naval SF • 2 FF	• Destruction of hostile surface and sub-surface assets
Anti Surface Warfare	▪ 2 Corv ▪ 1 Superlynx ▪ 2 NGPV	• Long range warning • Sea control or denial	• 3 Corv • 2 Superlynx • 1 PC	• Long range warning • Sea control or denial
Strike Warfare	▪ 3 FAC	▪ Sea-launched cruise missiles	• 2 FAC (G) • 2 Corv	• Sea-launched cruise missiles
Mine Warfare	▪ 2 FAC ▪ 2 MCMV		▪ 2 FAC (G) ▪ 2 MCMV	• lay mines to establish defensive minefields • hunting mines and neutralising mines
Total	18		22	

AIR FORCE CAPABILITY OVERVIEW

Elements	BLUFOR		LANFOR	
Role	Strength	Capabilities	Strength	Capabilities
Multirole Combat	▪ 10 x SU30 ▪ 5 x F/18D	▪ Multirole	▪ 22 x SU 30	▪ Multirole
AD/FGA	▪ 12 x MiG 29	▪ Air Superiority Fighter	▪ 15 x F-16	▪ Attack
AD/Recce	▪ 10 x F5E	▪ Combat radius with max payload - 195 miles	▪ 21 x F5E/F	▪ Combat radius with max payload - 195 miles
Attack	▪ 10 x Hawk	▪ AD, air denial, anti-shipping, interdiction, CAS and ground attack	▪ 20 x Hawk	▪ AD, air denial, interdiction, CAS and ground attack
Total	47		78	

Sample 3-12

AIR FORCE CAPABILITY OVERVIEW

Cont:

Element	BLUFOR		LANFOR	
	Strength	Capabilities	Strength	Capabilities
Fix wing	8 x CN 235	Transport	30 x C-130H	Transport
	21 x C-130	Transport	4 x CASA 212	Transport
	18 x SK61	Transport	4 x Black Hawk	Transport
Rotary wing			10 x Super PUMA	Transport
	29 X KC-130	AAR	2 x Boeing 707	AAR
Total	47		56	

Sample 3-12

SS 3 - Conduct Threat Mission Analysis

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The J2 staff is to assess operational threat intents at the operational level:

- ❑ The operational threat entity faced by the own/friendly commander – Responsible J's needs to identify own/friendly COG matrix
- ❑ Threat wider aims and intentions, including Military Strategic Objectives and Military Strategic End-State
- ❑ Likely threat commander's Intent, Mission & Tasks
- ❑ Threat Freedom of Action (Restriction & Constraints):
Eg. International pressure, International Law, Force Capabilities, Economic/Political Pressures
- ❑ Any Critical Facts & Assumptions

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Threat Mission Analysis



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THREAT WIDER AIMS

- **Military Strategic Objective**
 - Deterrence by conducting counter offensive on the KASUMA Island
 - Emphasizes the deployment of LANNAVY and LANAF capability for monitoring and control over dispute area
- **Military Strategic End State**
 - Protect sovereignty of KASUMA Island by all means
 - Extended strategic depth, extended beyond LANUNLAND territorial and maritime borders when the situation warrants

Threat Mission Analysis

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THREAT COMMANDER'S INTENT

PURPOSE (The reason for conducting the op)

Regain LANUN sovereignty over KASUMA Island

METHOD (Clarifies the effects on the threat in relation to the threat COG and the CF that may be exploited)

- ❖ Estb air superiority
- ❖ Gain control of ALOC
- ❖ Decisive engagement on ground of threat choosing
- ❖ Offensive manoeuvre (Land, Amph and Airborne)

THREAT END STATE (The set of desired condition beyond which the use of military force is no longer required to achieve national strat level obj)

- ❖ To capture KASUMA Island
- ❖ New borders sovereignty regained without affecting INDONESIA



Identify and Estimate Threat Commander's Mission

- Who?
- What?
- Where?
- When?
- Why?

Eg. Someone is to do something in a certain area by a time in order to achieve something

Threat Mission Analysis



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Example Mission Statement

LANFOR is to conduct offensive op to capture KASUMA Island through deployment of force IOT neutralize BLUFOR force sustenance and regain control over KASUMA before international/regional intervention take place

Sample 3-1



TASKS

- ❑ **SPECIFIED** (Tasks direct fm superior commander through high level doc)
- ❑ **IMPLIED** (Not specified by the superior commander but are those that necessary iot meet the Superior Comdr Intent)
- ❑ **ESSENTIAL** (Must be successfully conducted to achieve the msn and Superior Comdr intent. Identified from the list of Specified and Implied tasks)

Threat Mission Analysis

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THREAT TASKS

SPECIFIED

- Conduct offensive ops at KASUMA Island
- Neutralize BLUFOR force projection capability ivo KASUMA Island
- Conduct Amph Ops and Airborne Ops in KASUMA Island
- Reconsolidate and stabilize forces

IMPLIED

- Conduct ASW ops
- Conduct Amph Assault at KASUMA Island
- Conduct airborne op on KASUMA Island to secure VG in subsequent op
- Destroy BLUFOR C4ISRT
- Disrupt BLUFOR SLOC
- Deny BLUFOR air superiority

ESSENTIAL

- Conduct offensive ops at KASUMA Island
- Neutralize BLUFOR force projection capability ivo KASUMA Island
- Conduct Amph Ops and Airborne Ops in KASUMA Island

Sample 3-4

Threat Mission Analysis

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IDENT AND ANALYSE THREAT FREEDOM OF ACTION

RESTRICTION

Prohibitions on activities that a superior commander or another authority might impose (i.e. **You Must Not Do Something**)

CONSTRAINT

Actions imposed by a superior commander or another authority which must be undertaken (ie **You Must Do Something**)

Threat Mission Analysis



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IDENT AND ANALYSE CRITICAL FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

CRITICAL FACTS

Those truths of central importance to the commander to achieve the msn. Eg *THE FLOOD WILL ONLY RECEDE AFTER 12 MAY 2017*

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Are those the planning staff identify as particularly important with respect to operations and often carry significant risks

Unconfirmed statements which require verification. Eg *LANFOR EXPECTED WILL NOT DEPLOY THEIR TROOP INTO THAT AREA BEFORE 12 MAY 2017*

Undertake Threat Modelling




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- ☐ J2 Staff identify the threat operational level COG
- ☐ Conduct a COG Analysis to determine the op level CF
- ☐ All CF are portrayed on the **COG Analysis Matrix**
- ☐ Extract a comprehensive list of all potential targets to form the MTL
- ☐ Develop HVT list based on additional analysis of the threat CV

COG CONSTRUCT


The primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve an objective or the desired end state

3 Elm of COG Construction:




Characteristics of COG

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Identifying a COG



- ☐ Begin with - What is it that we and an threat are seeking to achieve? What is the primary goal? (what is most likely to be the desired end state and/or objectives?)
- ☐ Once the desired end state has been articulated - What are our own/the adversary's capabilities that are employed to reach that end state and which are critical to achieving the desired outcome? (What are the ways (verb) to arrive at operational success?)
- ☐ Having listed the CC - Ascertain if there is a significant enabler of the CC (Is there an entity (or entities) that produces all or most of the CCs in order that the objective can be achieved?)
- ☐ From this further analysis should emerge a prime means (noun) or entity without which we/the threat cannot achieve an objective.
- ☐ That entity is a likely **COG**

ENDS/GOAL

Disputed KASUMA ISLAND annexed and LANUN sovereign control of this area no longer militarily disputed

WAYS (verbs)	Means (nouns)
Manoeuvring of combat forces to seize and hold key ground	Amphibious Task Group
	Motorised Infantry
	Mobility support
	Offensive support
	C2 platforms
	AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)
Provision of sustained logistics support to combat forces	Transportation
	POL
	Munitions
Protection of amphibious movement and landing	OCA/DCA
	ISR platforms
	ASW support (Anti-Submarine Warfare)
	AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)

ENDS/GOAL

Disputed KASUMA ISLAND annexed and LANUN sovereign control of this area no longer militarily disputed

COG	CC (verbs)	CR (nouns)	CV (nouns)
AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP	Manoeuvring of combat forces to seize and hold key ground	Motorised Infantry	Vehicles
		Mobility support	Personnel
		Offensive support	Mobility support asset
		C2 platforms	Indirect fire weapons platforms
		AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)	Rigid C2 system with vulnerable nodes
	Provision of sustained logistics support to combat forces		Air defence platforms
		Transportation	Vehicles
		POL	Stock on hand
		Munitions	Storage
	Protection of amphibious movement and landing	OCA/DCA	Distribution facilities
		ISR platforms	Stock on hand
		ASW support (Anti-Submarine Warfare)	Storage facilities
		AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)	Fighter Ac
			AEWC
			Submarines
			Frigates
			Air defense platforms

Threat COG Analysis Matrix

COG	CC (verbs)	CR (nouns)	CV (nouns)
Amphibious Task Group	Manoeuvring of combat forces to seize and hold key ground	Motorised Infantry	Vehicles
			Personnel
		Mobility support	Mobility support asset
		Offensive support	Indirect fire weapons platforms
		C2 platforms	Rigid C2 system with vulnerable nodes
		AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)	Air defence platforms
	Provision of sustained logistics support to combat forces	Transportation	Vehicles
		POL availability	Stock on hand
			Storage
			Distribution facilities
		Munitions	Stock on hand
			Storage facilities
	Protection of amphibious movement and landing	OCA/DCA	Fighter Ac
		ISR platforms	AEWC
		ASW support (Anti-Submarine Warfare)	Submarines
			Frigates
		AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)	Air defence platforms ³⁰

Selection of Targetable CV

COG	CC	CR	CV
Amphibious Task Group	Manoeuvring of combat forces to seize and hold key ground	Motorised Infantry	Vehicles
			Personnel
		Mobility support	Mobility support asset
		Offensive support	Indirect fire weapons platforms
		C2 platforms	Rigid C2 system with vulnerable nodes
		AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)	Air defence platforms
	Provision of sustained logistics support to combat forces	Transportation	Vehicles
		POL availability	Stock on hand
			Storage facilities
			Distribution facilities
		Munitions	Stock on hand
			Storage facilities
	Protection of amphibious movement and landing	OCA/DCA	Fighter Ac
		ISR platforms	AEWC
		ASW support (Anti-Submarine Warfare)	Submarines
			Frigates
		AAW (Anti-Air Warfare)	Air defence platforms

Targeting

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- ❑ Further analysis on CV and develop Master Target List (MTL)

TARGETABLE CV	EFFECTED CR	SELECTED CC
Vehicles	Motorised Infantry	Manoeuvring of combat forces to seize and hold key ground
Mobility support asset	Mobility support	
Storage facilities	POL availability	Provision of sustained logistics support to combat forces
Frigates	ASW support	Protection of amphibious movement and landing
Air defence platforms	AAW support	

Targeting

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HVT LIST

TCV	HVT	PRIORITY	ASSOCIATED NAI	ASSOCIATED TAI
Vehicles	4×4 multi-purpose mine-resistant	MEDIUM	7,8,10	7,10
Mobility support asset	Rotary wing transport ac	HIGH	1,2,3	1,2,3
Storage facilities	Main dump point	HIGH	4,5,6	4,5,6
Frigates	Anti submarines frigates	MEDIUM	1,2,3,4,5,6	1,2,3,4,5,6
Air defence platforms	SHORAD	HIGH	GR123456	GR124457

Sample 3-7

Targeting



Cont:

- ❑ The COG analysis allows the comdr and staff to pinpoint relative strengths and weaknesses of the threat
- ❑ Some of the info from this analysis may be used by the planning staff to formulate DP in JMAP Step 3
- ❑ COG matrix+MTL+HVT list will assist the intelligence and operations staff in **wargaming** (JMAP Step 4)

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KEY PRODUCTS OF STEP 3

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- ☐ RMP, RAP and RASP showing threat force element dispositions
- ☐ ORBAT matrices and other capability listings including intelligence collection and CI capabilities
- ☐ Threat MA including threat Mission statement (Purpose, Method, End State), Objectives, Tasks and Limitations
- ☐ Threat doctrine statements and historical facts
- ☐ Threat COG analysis matrix
- ☐ MTL
- ☐ Initial HVT list
- ☐ JIPOE Step 3 Brief

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4c. Develop Indicators for COA
4d. Produce Draft Collection Plan

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DETERMINE THREAT COA/SCENARIO

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-  **Sub Step 1 - Review Threat Mission Analysis**
-  **Sub Step 2 - Develop Threat COA/Scenario**
-  **Sub Step 3 - Develop Indicators for COA**
-  **Sub Step 4 - Produce Draft Intelligence Collection Plan**

1. Define OE.
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DETERMINE THREAT COA/SCENARIO

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- ☐ Combined a comprehensive AOE + evaluation of the operational threat
- ☐ Develop a number of threat COA - from the most likely COA to the most dangerous COA
- ☐ Products used to determine threat COA fundamental to the JMAP wargaming
- ☐ Scenarios are developed when a threat cannot be clearly identified or
- ☐ the potential for unexpected events to have a significant impact on operations

SS1 - Review Threat Mission Analysis

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- ❖ Apply collective appreciation of the environment and threat to predict future threat activity
- ❖ To validate the threat MA undertaken in Step 3
- ❖ COA reflect threat and environmental reality rather than own/friendly forces mindset

1. Define OE.
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SS2 - Develop Threat COA/Scenario

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□ J2 staff should:

- ❖ Review the own/friendly complete COG Analysis Matrix (prepared by J3 and J5),
- ❖ the environmental effects on operations and
- ❖ assessed threat Mission Analysis
- ❖ Develop no of detailed threat COA/Scenario (Same as JMAP process)

1. Define OE.
2. Describe the Impact of OE.
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4. Determine Threat COA/ Scenario.

- 4a. Review Threat Mission Analysis
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Develop Threat COA/Scenario



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Cont:


- ❑ Based on own COG Analysis Matrix and Threat MA, develop the threat COA includes:
 - ❖ DP
 - ❖ LOO as well as CDP and Branches and Sequels including identification of NAI to support CDP
 - ❖ Applying timeline, phases and tasks and considering risks
 - ❖ DP, CDP and Threat Synchro Matrices (To be used during the COA Analysis)

Develop Threat Line Of Operation (LOO)

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LOO describe how military force is applied through DP on the path to the operational objective



Identifying Likely Threat Objectives

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- ❑ **Operational Objective** - A condition that needs to be achieved during a campaign or op to enable the desired end state to be reached SEQUEL
- ❑ Objectives are broader and more significant than DP
- ❑ The **End State** comprises a number of discrete outcomes or conditions that form the basis of objectives and the LOO associated with each objective
- ❑ Example – The **end state** is “Country Y insurgency operations have ceased, KASUMAN nationals in country X are secure, governance restored and MALFOR assets have been reassigned”



Definition

A significant **operational milestone** that exists in time and space or the information domain which constitutes a key event, essential task, critical factor or function that, when executed or affected, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage, or contributes to achieving success

Develop Threat Decisive Point (DP)

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- ❑ An operational milestone which is considered to be decisive in:
 - ❖ Reaching desired end state
 - ❖ Achieving an op objective
 - ❖ Affecting an adversary's CF or
 - ❖ Protecting friendly force CF
- ❑ Consists of a **number of tasks, action** and **activities**

Develop Threat Decisive Point (DP)

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- ❑ Used to synchro tasks and actions to ensure resources are available and used to max effect
- ❑ DPs are created from the combination of like tasks (in time or space) elicited from:
 - ❖ Specified, implied & essential tasks
 - ❖ Adversary forces actions to attack FF COG
 - ❖ Adversary forces actions to protect own COG

Characteristics of a DP



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- ❑ A DP will eloquent:
 - ❖ A purpose,
 - ❖ Outcome,
 - ❖ Task, or
 - ❖ Effect
- ❑ Must be measurable in terms of time, space or magnitude
- ❑ “Expressed in the past tense”
- ❑ DP articulates a purpose and is measurable

Characteristics of a DP



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- ❑ Can be expressed in terms of ‘if....then’—for example, ‘if friendly forces produce this effect, then the desired result will contribute to achieving the objective in the following way’
- ❑ Constructing DP statement:
 - ❖ Applied to – “threat CAP”
 - ❖ What the action or effect is created upon – “ALOC”
 - ❖ Tasking descriptor (mentioned in past tense) – “denied”
 - “The threat employment of CAP within own/friendly ALOC is denied”

Develop Threat Decisive Point (DP)



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DP1 - LANFOR freedom of unobserved manoeuvre denied NLT D-3


DP2 - Force concentration and preparation completed NLT D-2

DP3 - LANFOR SLOC to KASUMA Island is denied NLT D-1

DP4 - LANFOR ALOC to KASUMA Island is denied NLT D-1

DP 5 – Initial JTF FE deployed on order (D Day)

DP 6 – Routine security activities commenced NLT D+5




Threat Comdr's Decisive Points (CDP)

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- ❑ Is a point in time and space along a LOO at which commander must make a decision to influence the op
- ❑ Will always precede a **Branch** and **Sequel**
- ❑ Will identify the options the commander may wish to take and conditions that need to be set for each option
- ❑ The identify of CDP assist commander to sync the potential of all capabilities of the force



Branches and Sequel




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❑ **BRANCH**

- ❖ Is an option within a LOO designed to anticipate DP and provide commander with the flexibility to maintain initiative by anticipating sit that could alter the basic plan
- ❖ Add flexibility plans
- ❖ Deviation from and then return to the same LOO

❑ **SEQUEL**

- ❖ Subsequent op based on the possible outcomes of the current operations – victory, defeat or stalemate
- ❖ Significant shift in focus identifies a different LOO
- ❖ May or may not develop into different COA



DP 1 – The MAFOR employment of ISTAR within own/friendly SLOC and ALOC is denied
 DP 2 – The pre-emptive strike to the employment of threat is conducted
 DP 3 – The MAFOR land offensive manoeuvre is secured
 DP 4 – Estb log req within own/friendly to support and maintain force element is completed
 DP 5 – The MAFOR employment of CAP within own/friendly ALOC is denied
 DP 6 – Estb foothold in own/friendly is secured
 DP 7 – All key installation of MAFOR is destroyed
 DP 8 – MAFOR maritime capability is neutralised
 DP 9 – Integrated log sp to own/friendly force is estb
 DP 10 – STABOPS is conducted

CDP 1 – AIR SUPERIORITY AND SEA CONTROL ACHIEVED?

YES – Proceed with LOO
 NO – Proceed with Branch

CDP 2 – DOES COUNTER ACTION CONDUCTED BY MAFOR?

NO – Proceed with LOO
 YES – Proceed with Sequel

Develop Detailed Threat COA

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- ❑ Each of the stakeholders' or adversary's potential COA is then prioritised based on likelihood and an assessment made as to the 'most likely'
- ❑ Applying time lines, phases, associated tasks and considered risks
- ❑ If time available - threat COA will be developed further
- ❑ At minimum - COA statement, sketches or matrix should be produced

1. Define OE.
2. Describe the Impact of OE.
3. Evaluate the Threat.
4. **Determine Threat COA/ Scenario.**

- 4a. Review Threat Mission Analysis
- 4b. Develop Threat COA/Scenario**
- 4c. Develop Indicators for COA
- 4d. Produce Draft Collection Plan


Develop Detailed Threat COA




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BROAD COA

- **COA A.** LANFOR project mil force via **punch through** concept by using MER elm as main effort, Navy and Airforce as secondary effort. MER is projected fm LANUNLAND island toward S and enter via YAHYA beach before advance and secure DURI.
- **COA B.** LANFOR project mil force via **double envelopment** concept by depl two force as main effort which are MER and PARA Regt. MER is projected fm LANUNLAND island toward S and enter via YAHYA beach meanwhile PARA Regt drop at DZ. Then MER and PARA Regt will link up before advance and secure DURI. Along op sp by Navy and Airforce elm.
- **COA C.** LANFOR project mil force concept via **single envelopment** concept by depl PARA Regt only as main effort. PARA drop at DZ and continue adv and secure DURI. Along op sp by Navy and Airforce elm.
- ML COA. COA A
- MD COA. COA B



PARA



PARA

Detailed COA

Sample 4-3


Develop Detailed Threat COA



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Detailed COA

➤ **COA B.** LANFOR conduct pre-emptive strike to MALFOR radar capability at LABUAN and KUCHING using CAS. Launch shaping op by deploying ISR elm and SSK submarine to deny MALFOR ISR op. LMER to conduct invasion to KOTALAMA by conducting amph asslt and 2 x PARA Regt to conduct ABN op IVO KHAN IOT sp MER amph op. LN to prov LST to sp LMER amph op and prov NGS to gnd tp. LN asset to prov NGS and tpt tp using LST. LN vessel to conduct sea patrol and blockade in N of KOTALAMA. LAF to prov CAS, OCA, BAI and DCA. Naval and air assets to conduct sea and CAP IOT maint sy of EEZ after secured KOTALAMA. Maint RESUP fm LANFOR and max use of local resources.




Sample 4-3



Detailed COA

- **COA C.** LANFOR conduct pre-emptive strike to MALFOR radar capability at LABUAN and KUCHING using CAS. Launch shaping op by deploying ISR elm and SSK submarine to deny MALFOR ISR op. Para Regt conduct ABN op as ME and LN and LAF as SE to sec KOTALAMA. LN asset to prov NGS and tpt tp using LST. LN vessel to conduct sea patrol and blockade in N of KOTALAMA. LAF to prov CAS, OCA, BAI and DCA. Naval and air assets to conduct sea and CAP IOT maint sy of EEZ after secured KOTALAMA. Maint RESUP fm LANFOR and max use of local resources.




Sample 4-3



COA A (SHAPING PHASE)

DP	Events
10	MALFOR AD capability disrupted
1	RSI activity in AO detected until D Day.
2	ALOC within LAN and KOTALAMA airspace secured.
3	SLOC within LAN and KOTALAMA maritime area secured.




Sample 4-3a



COA A (DECISIVE PHASE)



DP	Events
4	Sy of LOC been controlled.
5	YAHYA beach been seized on D Day.
6	Sabotage to MALFOR log installation is conducted.
7	YAHYA power plant is captured NLT D+3.





COA A (SUSTAINE PHASE)

DP	Events
4	Sy of LOC been controlled.
5	YAHYA beach been seized on D Day.



Develop Threat DP Matrix



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- ☐ Provide the narrative and detail of each DP are vital descriptors of the condition or effect desired
- ☐ The likely forces required to create that effect, the CF protected or targeted, the essential tasks fulfilled and an idea of activities and their location in the OE
- ☐ Are not prescriptive by design and can be tailored to meet the commander's need
- ☐ Are used during JMAP COA Analysis

Develop Threat DP Matrix



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- ❑ A guidance to consider:
 - ❖ The primary focus—for example, an operational objective
 - ❖ The supporting ‘if...then’ logic
 - ❖ What CF are being affected—for example, combat air patrol (capability)
 - ❖ Tasking descriptor/effects verb—for example, ‘denied’
 - ❖ What tasks and activities (possibly including associated non-essential tasks identified in earlier planning) will need to be executed to bring about the desired effect, by which indicative FE, and where in the OE (deep, close or rear is one method).
 - ❖ An assessment plan that measures performance and effectiveness of the effects delivered, to inform progress towards successful achievement of the DP condition
 - ❖ A risk

Threat DP Matrix Sample

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DP No	DP Statement	Critical Factors affected	Task	Indicative Forces	Potential Subordinate JTF Action and Activities
1	LANFOR freedom of unobserved manoeuvre denied NLT D-2	CC 1 – Start Lift CR 3 – ALOC CV 4,5,7 – CAP	Estb air superiority IVO KASUMA Island	FA 18 KC 130	Conduct OCA in vicinity of KASUMA Island
				FA 18 KC 130	Estb AAR south of KASUMA Island
			Secure KASUMA Island airstrip	GBAD	Deploy GBAD assets to KASUMA Island
				SoF	Establish FMB to Sustain KECANA Island Garrison

Develop Threat CDP Matrix



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- ☐ Is a vital component of the commander's decision-making capability
- ☐ Closely linked to CCIR - will confirm the adversary's posture and assist in clarifying decision options in the matrix
- ☐ It informs and draws from the draft collection plan
- ☐ Will allow the commander to judge whether to continue down a LOO, branch to other DP or enact an operational pause until the desired operational conditions are in place

Threat CDP Matrix Sample

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CDP No	Time	Threat Condition	Friendly Force Condition	Commander's Options
1	D+1 to D+6	▪ D+6 Country X deterred from early lodgement in Country Y ▪ SSG located and fixed ▪ Limited CAP capability in vicinity of (IVO) Country Y – unable to achieve local air superiority ▪ NTG / ATG not transitioning for joint exercise to offensive operations	▪ Forward mounting base operational ▪ NTG IVO Country Y ▪ SSG IVO Country Y ▪ ISR assets on Country X ports and airfields (TAI 3/3A & 4/4A)	Option 1 • Progress with COA • Reinforce maritime / air presence Option 2 • Implement branch • Pre-emptive airborne lodgement in Country Y • Reinforce and defend Option 3 • Operational pause • Force preparations to set conditions for CDP 2 (strike)

Sample 4-5

Synchro Matrix (by Phases)



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THREAT ACTION		PHASE	01 PREP
		MAIN EFFORT	ISR
TIME	D - 14 / D-Day		
TASKS	Specified	Derived from Mission Analysis	
	Implied	Derived from Mission Analysis	
	Essential	Derived from Mission Analysis	
DEEP	Increased surv - F5E AIR RECONNAISSANCE (RASP), SUBMARINE SSK.		
CLOSE	Psyop unit conduct psyop at KASUMA Island, LAN LF conduct defense preparations, LAN LF secure SLOC, Sea Patrol and lay sea mine, LAN AF establish CAP, secure ALOC over KASUMA Island		
REAR	Naval Secure SLOC		
SUSTAINABILITY		Stock Build up, Increased POL at SAK	
DEDUCTIONS		Major log shortfalls and difficulties for prolonged ops	



Develop Indicators For COA

- ❑ Comdr aware Own/Friendly COA will **unlikely** proceed without incident, threat interference or other circumstances
- ❑ Effected the LOO
- ❑ Should be developed for each threat COA/Scenario to identify threat indicators such as patterns, profiles, deviations from a norm or model
- ❑ Indicator lists and matrices will be updated during JMAP COA Development and COA Analysis

LAUTAN PASIFIK PACIFIC OCEAN
LAUT CHINA SELATAN SOUTH CHINA SEA

Urutan / Projection : Mercator
Skala / Scale 1 : 3 960 000 (1:275078)

SEDALAMAN DENGAN METER
DEPTH IN METRES
TINGGIAN DENGAN METER
HEIGHT IN METRES

DATA SIKLOPS: Sedalaman area dalam yang diberikan
yang telah ditunjukkan dalam diagram ini.

ABIS: Untuk mengetahui lebih lanjut mengenai area dalam
dan sedalaman, silakan kunjungi situs web: pubs.cia.gov atau hubungi agensi terkait.

PERHATIAN: Untuk informasi lebih lanjut mengenai area dalam
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LANUNLAND

NAI 1

NAI 2

NAI 3

NAI 5

NAI 4

TAI 1

TAI 2

TAI 3

BLUELAND

NAI & TAI

INDICATORS MATRIX - COA 1 LANUN Pre-Emptive Assault on KASUMA

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Scenario 1/ COA 1	Scenario 2/ COA 2	Scenario 3/ COA 3	Scenario 4/ COA 4
(Indicator: What to look for, where (NAI) and when (no earlier – no later than)	LAN ATG diversion to SABAH at NAI 1 NLT 0730 D-1	(Indicator)	(Indicator)
(Indicator)	(Indicator)	(Indicator)	(Indicator)
Commander's Decision Point (CDP) – CDP 1			
Tactical/Level of Warning: Time available: Action:	Tactical/Level of Warning: Very High Time available: 0730 D-2 to 0730 D-1 Action: Activate KENARI defence plan	Tactical/Level of Warning: Time available: Action:	Tactical/Level of Warning: Time available: Action:
Notes: 1. 'Critical Indicators' directly link to decision points and either prove or disprove warning scenarios. They should be highlighted. 2. Indicators may be assessed against baseline normalcy with indicator activity assessed as routine, irregular, significant, extreme or unknown. 3. Time available for decisions is taken from the time key indicators are triggered plus intelligence processing time, less time required for action. Action may be to target the threat at a certain location in a specified way.			

Produce Draft Collection Plan



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- ❑ J2 prep the DRAFT FOR ICP to support the op
- ❑ The plan will identify:
 - ❖ Identify a number of PIR
 - ❖ Assign specific collection units and assets to task to answer the PIR
 - ❖ Provide detail about the NAI to support the CDP

1. Define OE.
2. Describe the Impact of OE.
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4a. Review Threat Mission Analysis
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Draft Collection Plan Example

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


PIR	NAI	Unit	Asset Tasked	Status
Current disposn of LANUN Airborne forces	1 & 3	Sqn 401	2 X MPA	In loc
LANFOR maritime forces ASW capabilities	4,5 & 6	NAVINT	2 X subs	In loc
LANFOR Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) disposn and capabilities	2 & 7	SFCC	Y Sqn 11 RGK	Ready to be deploy in 2 hour's notice
LANFOR main supply road (KESAS Highway and Kuala Selangor state road)	8	881 Army Aviation	2 x LOH	Ready to be deploy in 1 hour's notice
LANFOR ATG recce party insertion to Pantai Lima	9	165 MI Bn	2 x Tactical Surveillance PI	Ready to be deploy in 2 hour's notice



INT COLLECTION PLAN

PIR	NAI	Unit	Asset Tasked	Status
What is LANFOR maritime forces offensive capability?	1,2,3	GGK	- 3 x tim	KOTA KINABALU
	4,5	PASKAU	- 2 x tim	KOTA KINABALU
	6,7,8	PASKAL	- 3 x tim	TAWAU
What is LANFOR AD capabilities?	9	165 MIB	- 1 x tim	SG PETANI
LAN ISR elm collect info for airborne op.	10,11	165 MIB	-1 x tim	SG PETANI
LAN force disposition.	12	RMAF	- 2 x SU 30 MKM	GONG KEDAK
	13	RMN	- 1 x Super Lynx - KD PAHANG	KOTALAMA
	14	RMAF	- 2 X F/A 18	LABUAN



KEY PRODUCTS OF STEP 4



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- ❑ Detailed threat COA including Synchronisation Matrices by phase
- ❑ Indicator lists and matrices for each threat COA or scenario
- ❑ Complete Intelligence Estimate
- ❑ Draft Intelligence Collection Plan
- ❑ Complete JIPOE Brief

1. Define OE.
2. Describe the Impact of OE.
3. Evaluate the Threat.
4. Determine Threat COA/ Scenario.

4a. Review Threat Mission Analysis
4b. Develop Threat COA/Scenario
4c. Develop Indicators for COA
4d. **Produce Draft Collection Plan**



KEY PRODUCTS OF STEP 3 AND STEP 4

Step 3 - Evaluate the Threat

+

Step 4 - Determine Adversaries COA

=

ANALYSIS OF THE THREAT

- 1. Define Operational Environment.**
- 2. Describe the Impact of OE.**
- 3. Evaluate the Threat.**
- 4. Determine Adversaries COA.**



SUMMARY

□ **JIPOE is:**

- ❖ **A 4-step, continuous process that is integral to JMAP**
- ❖ **Used to maintain Commander's sit awareness**
- ❖ **Essentially Int function**
- ❖ **A process to analyse the threat and the environment**