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Apr 12

MK ATM/12/01

EXERCISE PAHLAWAN 15/13 - INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MALAYSIA (OPERATION WIRA)

References:

- A. MK ATM J5PLANS/1/10-01 - Military Strategic Estimate of the Situation in Eastern Malaysia, dated 26 Feb 12.
- B. UN S/Res/8380 - UNSCR 8380 dated 5 Feb 11.
- C. UN S/Res/8450 - UNSCR 8450 dated 10 Feb 12.
- D. UN S/Res/8456 - UNSCR 8456 dated 25 Feb 12.
- E. ASEAN Resolution on Situation in Eastern Malaysia dated 18 Feb 12.

To: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
MAF Joint Force Commander

1. **APPOINTMENT.** You are appointed as the Commander Joint Force for Operation WIRA and you are to exercise Operational Command (OPCOM) of Malaysian forces assigned to the operation from the MK ATM. Within your Joint Area of Operations Area (JAO) you are responsible to me for the conduct of operations of all assigned forces, including their intelligence, logistics/sustainability, communications, administrative and medical support.

2. **SITUATION.**

- a. **General.** Following the invasion of Ramasi Island by Taranasebun in Feb 11, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 8380 (Feb 11) condemning Taranasebun actions, demanding a Taranasebun withdrawal and calling for negotiations to resolve differences between Malaysia and Taranasebun. ASEAN met early on in the crisis, also calling for an immediate withdrawal of Taranasebun's forces from the Island. All attempts to resolve the issue diplomatically failed and, using Ramasi Island as a Forward Mounting Base,

Taranasebun invaded Miri in Eastern Malaysia in Feb 12, establishing a lodgement and imposing a 20 km Zone of Separation around Miri. The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 8450 on 10 Feb 12 condemning the invasion of Miri by Taranasebun forces, reaffirming UNSCR 8380 and calling on Taranasebun to cease all military action and withdraw. At a further meeting of the Security Council on 25 Feb 12 UNSCR 8456 was passed, imposing a number of economic sanctions on Taranasebun and reaffirming the right of collective or individual self-defence in response in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. ASEAN is unified in its opposition to Taranasebun aggression in the region. Following the ASEAN summit on 18 Feb 12 a resolution was passed condemning the Taranasebun's attack on Miri and demanding their immediate withdrawal. To-date all diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation have failed. Moreover, Taranasebun actions in Miri have led to some 150,000 IDPs leaving the combat zone for various locations in Eastern Malaysia. The Malaysian Government has determined that the situation in the region, and in particular, in Eastern Malaysia could result in the risk of a wider regional conflict, together with a humanitarian crisis. MK ATM has conducted a thorough military strategic estimate of the situation (based on advice from MK ATM, MK AB and Government departments) at Reference A. On the basis of that advice CDF directs MK AB to initiate planning for possible military operations in Eastern Malaysia based on the government's political direction. Military operations will be planned in close cooperation with other national efforts within an overall strategic approach of regional engagement to resolve the crisis and improve stability.

b. **Objectives.** The government's strategic objective is to rapidly deploy military forces to demonstrate intent in parallel with diplomatic and other measures designed to restore the status quo ante. The main Political Objective is to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Eastern Malaysia and to resolve outstanding territorial disputes. The strategic aim is to re-establish Malaysian sovereignty and reimpose stability to the region based upon international security that promotes confidence, constrains external aggressive influences and respects recognised borders and the principle of non-interference in neighbouring states.

3. **TASK.** You are to plan to conduct operations in the JAO to re-establish Malaysian territorial integrity and sovereignty on mainland Eastern Malaysia.

4. **OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS.**

a. **Political Constraints:**

(1) Malaysia does not own the political process and must work with the IC toward a brokered political end-state.

(2) MAF operations will be conducted within the framework of a UN mandate, and under the principle of self-defence preserved in Article 51 of the UN Charter and in compliance with international law.

- (3) MAF will operate within a government approved JAO.
- (4) MAF will operate under Malaysian Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- (5) The Joint Force will use all available means to restore Malaysian territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
- (6) MAF operations will be conducted in a manner that minimises interference with international shipping and the right to transit.
- (7) MAF must be able to sustain operations for as long as it takes to achieve the end state.

b. Political Restraints:

- (1) Forward staging of MAF forces will be limited initially to Eastern Malaysia.
- (2) International borders will not be crossed without diplomatic clearance, agreements or government approval.
- (3) MAF will make every effort to minimise collateral damage and civilian casualties.
- (4) MAF operations will make every effort to limit environmental destruction and prevent damage to natural energy resources and infrastructure.
- (5) Civil authorities have primacy over persons detained for acts of destruction against the State unless positively identified as belonging to the military of the hostile state.
- (6) Neutrals are not to be interfered with.
- (7) The casualty rate is to be kept to the minimum.
- (8) There is to be no strike outside own EEZ without cabinet approval.

c. Political Assumptions. The following assumptions have been agreed as a basis for planning:

- (1) The UN will provide the legal mandate for the use of all necessary means, including the use of force, required to achieve international objectives.

(2) IO/NGOs will remain engaged in the region as long as favourable security conditions exist.

(3) Given other commitments around the world, a timely military response by the International Community is very unlikely.

(4) Significant media attention will be given to Malaysian military operations.

(5) It is assessed that unless the Malaysian Government demonstrates the determination to take on Taranasebun directly using 'all necessary means' and for as long as it takes the Taranasebun regime will continue to execute their strategic plans.

(6) Taranasebun will not withdraw unilaterally from Eastern Malaysia without being forced.

(7) The Main Effort will be against Taranasebun units occupying areas of mainland Eastern Malaysia. There will, almost certainly, be a requirement to take on Taranasebun forces beyond mainland Eastern Malaysia and Contingency Planning should be conducted accordingly.

5. **PRELIMINARY PLANNING GUIDANCE.** I shall provide strategic direction for operations through the JCC. In consultation with my staff and the Army, Navy and Air Force Commands you are to conduct planning for an Intervention Operation in Eastern Malaysia.

a. **Probable Mission.** To conduct military operations to restore Malaysian territorial integrity and re-establish national control of mainland Eastern Malaysia in order to set the conditions for long term regional stability.

b. **CDF's Intent.** It is my intent that robust plans are developed for the conduct of military operations in Eastern Malaysia. Close departmental collaboration is necessary to tackle the complexity of the potential challenges in the region.

c. **Key Military Tasks.** Acting in accordance with extant UNSCRs, you are authorized to proceed with operational planning for the military tasks proposed as a basis for subsequent execution directives: These tasks are:

(1) Secure LOC (Sea and air) between peninsular and Eastern Malaysia.

(2) Prepare and, when authorized, rapidly deploy forces to JAO.

(3) Interdict Taranasebun LOC from Ramasi Island to Eastern Malaysia.

- (4) Isolate Taranasebun forces on Ramasi Island.
- (5) Evict Taranasebun forces from mainland Eastern Malaysia.
- d. Supporting Military Tasks:
 - (1) Be prepared to assist local government and IO/NGOs to return IDPs to their homes and restore mainland Eastern Malaysia to normalcy.
- e. Planning Considerations. You are to consider:
 - (1) The assumptions laid out in this Directive,
 - (2) Whether any immediately ready forces should be directed to move early to the likely area of operations, and under what Command and Control (C2) arrangements,
 - (3) The appropriate level of seniority for the Joint Task Force Commander,
 - (4) The composition of, and C2 for the force,
 - (5) The impact on other operations, commitments and the future availability of contingency forces,
 - (6) The support of other potential allies and whether they require Malaysian support,
 - (7) Appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE), passing the ROE Request to my staff for consideration at the earliest opportunity,
 - (8) A Risk Assessment,
 - (9) Force protection, including defensive Electronic Warfare (EW),
 - (10) Suitable Forward Mounting Bases (FMBs) and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs),
 - (11) The use of Information Operations,
 - (12) The anticipated cost of the Intervention Operation,
 - (13) Media coverage and Media Operations' surge support requirements,

f. Force. Forces assigned to this operation are detailed at **Annex A**. Recommendations for any proposed change should be submitted to MK ATM for my consideration.

g. Government Support. The Malaysian government fully supports Op WIRA and all national instruments will be mobilised in support of the military but with minimal disruption to the economy. You are to provide a list of additional support required including:

- (1) Additional civil aircraft for deployment and sustainment.
- (2) Additional shipping for deployment and sustainment.
- (3) Railway requirements for deployment and sustainment.
- (4) Civilian Contractor Support.

The normal division of responsibilities applies:

Organisation	Responsibility
National Security Division	Formulation of comprehensive and coordinated security policies, the coordination of policy direction, security operation and managing matters relating to the overall national security
Royal Malaysia Police	Defence of core areas particularly in matters of Internal Security, rear area security, control of refugees and as reserves for the Armed Forces.
Department of Public Health	Treatment of casualties and medical resupply.
Social Welfare Department	The well being of displaced people.
PETRONAS	Petrol and gas supply
MISC	Sea Transportation

6. END STATES AND OBJECTIVES.

a. National Endstate. Sovereignty, stability and security restored such that it forms the basis for a stable, well-balanced, long term and effective political solution to regional issues. This will be achieved when:

- (1) Eastern Malaysia secure within existing boundaries.
- (2) The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all states are no longer threatened.
- (3) Regional stability enhanced through a security environment that is consistent with and allows the implementation of a settlement between Malaysia and Taranasebun.
- (4) Civilian populations are protected from physical harm and human rights abuses.
- (5) Progress is being made toward mitigating conditions that contribute to the spread of conflict.
- (6) Taranasebun restored as a co-operative member of the International Community respecting international agreements and prepared to resolve its external differences through peaceful means.

b. Political Objectives. Achieving the desired end state requires the creation of conditions for a sustainable regional security environment that is sufficiently permissive for the population at large to conduct their lives free from threat and coercion. This will be supported by the following objectives:

- (1) Demonstrate Malaysian resolve.
- (2) Prevent further regional escalation and widening of the crisis.
- (3) The government of Malaysia is able to exercise their legitimate and responsible authority throughout the country. Specifically:
 - (a) Set the conditions for a lasting political solution.
 - (b) Encourage interested parties in the region to resolve outstanding territorial and economic disputes.
 - (c) Support international rule of law.
 - (d) Counter regional peace spoilers.

(4) Protect human rights and enable humanitarian assistance to IDPs and Refugees.

(5) No further Taranasebun aggression.

c. Interim Aim. Recognising the enduring nature of the Political objectives, the interim aim is:

(1) Recover lost Malaysian territory on mainland Eastern Malaysia.

(2) Render further attack by Taranasebun against Malaysia unlikely.

(3) Immediate Humanitarian Relief needs met.

(4) Return of IDPs facilitated.

(5) Create the conditions for future political negotiations to end hostilities.

d. Military Endstate. Eastern Malaysia secure within existing boundaries and regional stability enhanced through a security environment that is consistent with and allows the implementation of a settlement between Malaysia and Taranasebun. The JTF is safely recovered.

7. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Timetable. MK AB will provide a CONOPS for consideration by the Joint Chief's Committee by 14 Mei 12.

b. Timings. To be developed in conjunction with the COAs.

c. Joint Area of Operations. Your JAO is defined at **Annex B**. Any requirement to change the JAO must be cleared through me.

d. Force Protection. The situation is unstable, and the Operation is likely to take place in a volatile security situation, the requirement for force protection will be a high priority. You are to consider appropriate force protection force elements and measures commensurate with the situation, my intent and the constraints.

e. Information Strategy. The Information Strategy for Op WIRA will be released at a later date.

(1) Information Operations (Info Ops). Drawing upon Info Ops lessons identified from previous operations, you should consider all the tools of Info Ops in the planning process; particularly force presence, posture and profile, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Information Security and EW. Early production of suitable PSYOPS products should also be considered.

(2) Media Operations. You are to plan to adopt a Semi-Active¹ media ops profile; detailed terms and conditions will be promulgated later. You should prepare media 'Lines To Take' in consultation with my staff and single service commands Media Operations staff.

f. Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF are to contribute to joint planning through the provision of advice in Malaysia, and as part of any JFHQ reconnaissance.

8. **INTELLIGENCE**.

a. Intelligence Assessment. An initial intelligence assessment of the situation and the enemy capabilities is at **Annex C**.

b. Area of Intelligence Interest (All). The All as it affects operational access and operations to defeat Taranasebun forces in Eastern Malaysia is defined in **Annex B**. In addition, the All is to include UN and ASEAN in respect of any bilateral or multi-lateral political/military developments that might affect the situation and the operation.

9. **SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT**. The following instructions apply:

a. Logistic Planning. You are to plan to deploy and sustain assets, initially self-sustaining for up to 30 days, with reinforcement or supply from peninsular Malaysia, and to recover them on completion. You should consider in conjunction with the APG contingency sustainability plans to make provision for an extended deployment. Capacity constraints of logistic enablers mean that your planning should consider appropriate use of in-theatre contractor support. You are to identify any shortfalls in logistic capability to the AKS LP. You are to consider appropriate sustainability statements for the service commands. Single service commands will remain responsible for manning and equipping their force elements in accordance with your priorities.

b. Strategic Movement. Your plans are to include the deployment, sustainment and subsequent recovery of the force. You are to ensure that wherever possible deployment plans enable the force to achieve the earliest possible IOC and FOC. Where clashes of priority occur with support to other operations and training activity that cannot be reconciled you are to request direction from my staff.

c. Logistic Governance. You are to ensure that a focus and technical expertise for all aspects of logistics within all compartments exist within the Force

¹ A Semi-Active Media Operations Profile is a profile which seeks to inform the media/public without intending to expand or intensify media/public interest.

HQ. If required, your plans are to ensure that a Joint inspection regime is put in place, including single service command's assets and coordinated by JFHQ.

d. Medical. Based on a clear assessment of risk, you are to plan for the provision of timely medical support and casualty transfer for deployed forces. You should plan for Medical support to civilian personnel evacuated under the authority of this directive.

10. **COMMAND AND CONTROL.**

a. National Command. All Malaysian Armed Forces will remain under National Command.

b. OPCOMD. You will exercise OPCOMD of Malaysian assigned land, maritime and air at Annex A, [including SF], within the JAO.

c. OPCON. You may delegate OPCON and TACCON of Malaysian forces under your OPCOMD as deemed appropriate.

d. Operation Name. OP WIRA.

11. **REPORTING**. Any proposed changes to the CONOPs or COAs are to be forwarded to the JCC, having allowed sufficient time for consideration by my Staff. Should changes in the situation dictate that the operation is to be conducted in a short timeframe, you are to refer any time critical proposals or recommendations (such as recommended changes to Notice to Move) to JCC as soon as they are known.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

General

Chief of Defence Force

Annex:

- A. Force Assigned.
- B. JAO.
- C. Intelligence Estimate.

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